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 FROM TH E TH EATRE IN  MON TAIGN E  
TO TH E PH ILOSOPH Y IN  SH AKESPEARE  
–  TH E MANY-SIDED SKEPSIS  
Rui Bertrand ROMÃO 
This paper includes two parts. In the first one I try to show that not only theatre is of the utmost importance for 
Montaigne as theatricality forms a prominent dimension of the Essais, revealed for instance in the scenographic 
conception of the framework of the book an din the way theatrical devices are assimilated in the Essais. In the 
second part, I consider a comedy of Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, a play most likely written after 
Shakespeare’s reading of Florio’s translation of the Essais, as an example of a philosophical play that shows 
traces of Ancient sceptical themes, processes and problems. 
Du Théâtre de Montaigne à la Philosophie de Shakespeare: plusieurs facettes de la Skepsis Le point de 
départ de cette communication se place dans l’entrecroisement de deux considérations : celle de l’assimilation 
de dispositifs théâtraux dans les Essais de Montaigne ; et celle de l’édification par Shakespeare, tout au long 
de ses pièces et poésies, d’une philosophie personnelle, dans laquelle convergent lectures et influences de la 
plus grande variété. Cet entrecroisement nous permettra de voir comment se développe chez les deux auteurs 
un scepticisme éclectique, déterminé d’une façon propre et spécifique chez l’un et chez l’autre, et d’étudier et 
comparer ces développements. 
ontaigne not only greatly enjoyed theatre, both ancient and 
contemporary, especially neo-Latin tragedies and Italian 
comedies, even having been, in his schooldays, an amateur 
actor, as his taste for drama is somehow transmitted to his writing and, 
I venture, absorbed into the new genre of “Essay”. As for Shakespeare, 
it is possible to find throughout his plays and poetry, if not exactly the 
proper delineation of a determined philosophy, more or less easily 
identifiable, at least the handling of many philosophical problems, 
themes and ideas, as well as the traces of several philosophical 
influences and readings. In both authors, it is arguable that a kind of 
eclectic Scepticism can be seen developing through their respective 
works, though in quite different ways. The main purpose of this paper 
is, precisely, to show a way of conceiving how Montaigne and 
Shakespeare share this kind of philosophical inclination by 
highlighting its reflection in an aspect of the work of each author which 
bears traces of the genre mainly cultivated by the other and 
immediately associated with him. Thus, saying it straightforwardly and 
clearly but perhaps too simplistically, I shall here consider Montaigne 
as a sort of playwright and Shakespeare as something of an essayist, 
M 
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the works of both exhibiting a deep concern with sceptical problematics 
and procedures and with Scepticism, in general. 
 
I 
 
When I speak of conceiving Montaigne as a sort of playwright, I do not 
mean that it is possible to imagine he really wrote the whole or even 
some of the chapters of his book as a dramatist, having recourse to a 
somewhat comparable array of literary and showman techniques, or 
that the Essais should be read as transfigured plays. What I mean is 
something else: that the theatricality is a greatly relevant dimension of 
the Essais, the theatre even providing a significant model to the 
conception of the Essais as a literary genre and that its influence (let us 
name it so) can be seen in someway incorporated into Montaigne’s 
writing374. 
Allusions of various kinds to theatre, both in Antiquity and in 
modern times, quotations from plays, namely by Terence and Plautus, 
among others, and considerations upon several aspects of the dramatic 
art including words of defence and praise, are quite frequent in the 
Essais and immediately reflect an unfaltering love for theatre. The 
same love is also patent in Montaigne’s Journal de Voyage, where we 
learn that he watched, and appreciated theatrical performances in 
Bologna and Pisa (Montaigne 1992, 77, 188) and that in a printer’s 
shop in Florence he bought some eleven comedies (Montaigne 1992, 
187). 
At the end of one of the chapters of the Essais where theatre’s 
presence is more evident (I, 26 –  “De l’Institution des Enfans”), in the 
1588 couch of the text, we find a famous digression where, invoking his 
own example and that of French Princes, Montaigne defends acting as 
an activity becoming well-born children. He hints at its pedagogical 
virtues and formative importance, criticises its enemies and argues for 
the favouring of theatrical companies and of permanent playhouses, 
from a well-substantiated political and social standpoint (I, 26, 176b-
                                                 
374
 Among the several texts where is studied the relation between the Essais and the 
theatre and Montaigne’s taste for the dramatic art, in its varied forms, special references 
must be made to the following ones: Ehrlich 109-124; Fumaroli, 1994, 151-158; Delègue, 
1998, 79-86; Guerrier 34-35, 282-312, 362-374, 412-424. 
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177b)375. It must be recalled that some lines up, and in the 1580  text, 
Montaigne, speaking of himself as a young reader, had mentioned 
Latin and Italian comedies as one of his passions then (I, 26, 175a). The 
whole passage is of particular interest for us for revealing in the space 
of few lines, and along several couches of the text, the threefold nature 
of Montaigne’s experience of Theatre, acquired soon in his life: as an 
actor, as a spectator and as a reader. Without this rich and varied 
knowledge it is for us difficult to imagine that the elements of 
theatricality in the Essais would be so abundantly expressed and so 
clearly understandable as they are. 
The more outstanding features of that theatricality, which also 
can be seen functioning as, in a way or in the other, interwoven into a 
formal dimension of the Essais, seem mainly to be the following: the 
scenographic conception of the framework of the book; the extensive 
use of images and metaphors related to theatre throughout the text; the 
incorporation in it of an internalised principle of dialogical 
dramatisation and the constant utilisation by its author of expressive 
techniques linked to theatre as communication, including stylistic 
means connoted with dramatic m im esis. 
Even those who are not favourable to the interpretations of the 
Essais that emphasise its order cannot elude the possibility of seeing in 
it, if not a very rigid formal architecture (just like, for instance, the one 
sketched by Daniel Martin in his brilliant studies and based on the 
conjunction of mnemonics with mythology –  see Martin 5, 32-34, 64-
79) at least some sort of architectural framework, certainly complex 
and difficult to fully understand in  its determinacy, but nonetheless 
firm and solid enough. We should indeed give some consideration to 
Montaigne’s having, from edition to edition of the Essais, maintained 
unaltered its division into chapters, in spite of all his constant 
additions, for he had the care of creating a new and supplementary 
third book to be added to the former two when in 1588 he published 
entirely new chapters, originating what would become the definitive 
skeleton of his book. Thus grew the work, it enlarged and it developed, 
without any of the main parts of the building, once raised, having its 
original plan or façade altered. If we want to conciliate this firm 
architecture with the openness of the form of the Essais and the 
                                                 
375
 All references to Montaigne’s Essais in this article are given according to Villey-
Saulnier’s edition (Montaigne 1965). 
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flexibility of its writing, perhaps the image of a theatrical and 
scenographic space would be the more adequate one. It is for us 
possible to conceive of the scenic functionality of such an architecture 
as a space where the fixed elements, articulated in an illusionist fashion 
according to perspective principles, form a sort of three-dimensional 
framework (presenting to the reader/ spectator heads of chapters 
denoted numerically, related to each other by disposition and ordering, 
content, and meaning and symbolic value) with strong classical 
references. This framework encompasses the stage where the 
performances take place, its variable scenic background adapting itself 
to the diversity of stories, characters, speeches, arguments, images, 
opinions and ideas there presented and developed, the protagonist 
Montaigne playing several parts and functions and going from one 
place to the other in and off the stage. 
The image of the Theatre I have here in mind is a contemporary 
architectural masterpiece of the ending sixteenth century, the Olympic 
Theatre in the town of Vicenza (Teatro Olim pico di Vicenza) due to 
Andrea Palladio, whose construction, we are told (Schiavo 97), began 
curiously and by sheer coincidence on the 28th February, 1580 , that 
very significant day in Montaigne’s life, his 47th birthday and the eve of 
the day printed in the foreword “To the Reader” in the Essais. The 
most remarkable part of the Olympic Theatre can be considered 
perhaps the backstage-screen (frons scenae) with its three-ordered 
façade including an evocation of Roman triumphal arches and the 
background perspectives by the “scene-designer” Vincenzo Scamozzi. 
Of course, this remains an analogy, but it has the quality of providing a 
plausible model for the relation between the architectural building of 
the Essais and its openness of form, linked with the peculiarity of the 
essayistic text. 
Among the references to theatre made by Montaigne I have 
previously alluded to, those which seem more important to my purpose 
are the images related to theatre that include first of all what has been 
called the “role-playing metaphor” (Levine 287). While some seem 
perhaps no more than incidental observations or notes (even then 
possibly significant, all the same), the vast majority of them are as 
relevant as revealing. I will recall briefly the most important passages 
in which they occur. 
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One of the most striking uses of that kind of imagery is the 
crucial and central passage of the chapter “Qu’il ne faut pas juger de 
nostre heur, qu’apres la mort”, where Montaigne, speaking of the 
saying by Solon that serves as the title of the chapter, produces its 
interpretation in alternative to the one that stresses human 
dependence on Fortune’s tides and vicissitudes. What is at issue, for 
him, in that maxim is, really, the spiritual fortitude of a philosopher, 
which can only be attributed to someone post-m ortem , that is to say, 
after the final test to the sage’s behaviour that is death itself. To express 
his idea Montaigne recurs to a variant of the classical commonplace by 
which life is compared to a drama of which in the last act supervenes 
death, man taking off his actor’s mask: 
Ainsi se peut prendre avec raison ce bon advis de Solon. Mais d’autant 
que c’est un philosophe, à l’endroit desquels les faveurs et disgraces de 
la fortune ne tiennent rang ny d’heur, ny de mal’heur; et sont les 
grandeurs et puissances, accidens de qualité à peu pres indifferente: je 
trouve vray-semblable qu’il aye regardé plus avant, et voulu dire que ce 
mesme bon-heur de nostre vie, qui dépend de la tranquillité et 
contentement d’un esprit bien né, et de la résolution et asseurance d’une 
ame reglée, ne se doive jamais attribuer à l’homme qu’on ne luy aye veu 
jouër le dernier acte de sa com edie, et sans doute la plus difficile. En 
tout le reste il y  peut avoir du m asque: ou ces beaux discours de la 
Philosophie ne sont en nous que par contenance; ou les accidens, ne 
nous essayant pas jusques au vif, nous donnent loysir de maintenir 
tousjours nostre visage rassis. Mais à ce dernier rolle de la m ort et de 
nous, il n’y a plus que faindre, il faut parler François, il faut montrer ce 
qu’il y a de bon et de net dans le fond du pot… (I, 19, 79a-80b, my 
emphasis) 
The last part of one’s life is also the one where the actor may reveal 
himself a philosopher. The theatre here is thus implicitly compared to 
the tribunal of posterity. 
Another well known variant of the same comparison of life to 
drama appears in the chapter, “De l’inequalité qui est entre nous”, 
where reference is made to a parallel between sovereigns and players 
who perform princely roles, royal pomp functioning as a scenic artifice 
that dazzles and confounds the spectators. Backstage, the masks falling 
off, both groups of comedians that looked unequal on stage become 
equal in their vileness and misery: 
Car, comme les joueurs de comedie, vous les voyez sur l’eschaffaut faire 
une mine de Duc et d’Empereur; mais, tantost apres, les voylà devenuz 
valets et crocheteurs miserables, qui est leur nayfve et originelle 
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condition: aussi l’Empereur, duquel la pompe vous esblouit en public, 
[…] voyez le derriere le rideau, ce n’est rien qu’un homme commun, et, à 
adventure, plus vil que le moindre de ses subjects. (I, 42, 261a) 
In II, 36, “Des plus excellens homes”, the claiming of some 
connection with Homer’s heroes and stories makes Montaigne extend 
the comparison to the dimensions of universal History, the comparison 
acquiring a clear and unequivocal deprecating tone, due to the explicit 
reference to farce: 
N’est-ce pas une noble farce de laquelle les Roys, les choses publiques et 
les Empereurs vont jouant leur personnage tant de siecles, et à laquelle 
tout ce grand univers sert de theatre? (I, 36, 261a, my emphasis) 
In another occasion, in the chapter “Que Philosopher c’est 
apprendre à mourir” (I, 20 , 93a-94a), the comparison is also pursued 
in a cosmic key, when nature, in a grandiloquent prosopopeia, presents 
her four seasons as the four acts of her annual comedy, where the 
world “acts his part” (“joue son jeu”), in a cyclically renewed 
production: 
Et, au pis aller, la distribution et varieté de tous les actes de ma comedie 
se parfournit en un an. Si vous avez pris garde au branle de mes quatre 
saisons, elles embrassent l’enfance, l’adolescence, la virilité et la 
vieillesse du monde. Il a joué son jeu. Il n 'y sçait autre chose que 
recomencer. (I, 20 , 93a-94a) 
The image of mask, frequent in the Essais, referring either to 
the opposition between interior and exterior or to the opposition 
between being and seeming, or to both, is some times employed for 
itself, independently from a theatrical context. However its 
connotations with theatre remain always altogether explicit and clear. 
One of the more noted of these uses occurs in “De mesnager sa 
volonté”, in a passage with clear political resonance, where Montaigne 
after quoting the famous fragment attributed to Petronius (“fere totus 
mundus exercet histrionem”) in a hyperbolic variant (“Mundus 
universus exercet histrionem”) treats the idea of role playing, crossing 
it with other related new images, in the context of the contrast between 
public life and private life, which, he sustains, must remain distinct and 
apart from each other (III, 10 , 1011b-1012b). 
Elsewhere, in the precedent chapter, “De la vanité”, in another 
much quoted text, to emphasise the ridicule and fatuity of human 
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condition and above all of his conceit and his pretensions, Montaigne 
puts in the mouth of Apollo the words referring to the exposure of man 
as the fool of a universal farce (III, 9, 1001b): “tu es le scrutateur sans 
connoissance, le magistrat sans jurisdiction et apres tout le badin de la 
farce”. 
These few examples of theatrical metaphors in the Essais may 
suffice to make clear that for Montaigne the use of theatrical imagery 
(including role-playing) more than forming mere episodic means of 
exclusively literary effect expresses a W eltanschauung  of which 
theatricality is a fundamental part. That cannot be but quite 
understandable if we bear in mind that in the Essais the reflection on 
illusion and on the mechanisms of simulation and dissimulation plays 
such an important role376. 
Apart from this imagery, many expressive processes and 
stylistic devices employed in the Essais may also be seen as 
contributing to its theatricality for their relation to similar processes 
used in playwriting such as: the use of sudden transitions and the 
constant creation of manifold surprise effects (which Lino Pertile 
detected inscribed in the formal conception of the book as a “structure 
of unpredictability”, “unpredictability in the Essais” being “a formal 
expression of irresolution in the essays” –  Pertile 214); the exploration 
of comic and dramatic effects; the valorisation of the charge of 
significance of visual elements in several narrative sequences, namely, 
those related to historical episodes; the use of contrasts as means of 
accentuating textual dynamics; the conjugation of changes of rhythm 
in the discursive tem po with changes of perspective. 
A reference must also be made to the assimilation in the text (as 
well as in its literary form) of the Essais of dialogical methods and 
characteristics of the genre dialogue and of its inherent principle of 
dramatisation. 
What presents itself as an evident and distinctive trait of the 
philosophical dialogue, and from the start seems to be quite close to 
Montaigne’s Essais, inheres in the circumstance that the 
argumentation is established and made through the confrontation 
between two, or more, personified voices, to each corresponding a 
particularised attitude, a unique tone and an individual perspective, 
which can be multifaceted and unstable. Even in “false” dialogues, 
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 Cf. Delègue 15-33, 139-164. 
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those which, being guided in predetermined direction by a dominant 
character, reduce interlocution to a secondary role, exposition is 
pursued having in consideration a latent opposition, the virtuality of an 
adverse positioning or the possibility of objections and divergences 
which must be anticipated or otherwise faced. In the dialogues where 
there is a great equilibrium of voices, as well as in those dialogues that 
obey to the alternation of interlocutors which incarnate or declare 
antithetical postures, attitudes and theories, the clash of opinions, 
ideas and viewpoints, forming a zigzagging itinerary, is the most 
conspicuous element that contributes to confer to the genre its formal 
identity. 
Montaigne gives an interior dimension to this dialogical 
procedure in several ways: transferring it to the inner self; assimilating 
it to the practice of diachronic commentary; incorporating it as a factor 
of structuration in an argumentative discourse; fusing it to the textual 
fabric. The plurivocity, extrovert in the dialogues, thus becomes a 
fundamental element of the movement proper to each chapter of the 
Essais and a central piece of the multifarious course of the exercise of a 
iudicium  that, inscribed in the text, examines, in their variety and 
through ever changing perspectives, the several subjects he has to deal 
with. 
We can thus discover in the discourse of the Essais the 
integration of elements associated with theatre, coexisting with its use 
as a centre of thematic proliferation, the use of these elements by 
Montaigne being in perfect agreement with the philosophical 
specificity of the Essais. 
 
II 
 
Montaigne’s influence on Shakespeare, though some scholars have 
contested it in some particular points, can be considered, if not since 
the end of the eighteenth century at least since a few decades later, as a 
well established fact. An important aspect of that influence has been 
recognised by most authors as of a philosophical kind and of more or 
less clearly sceptical overtones. Apart from influences, even this 
particular one, it has not been uncommon that in the course of the last 
century reflection upon Shakespeare’s texts and characters has led to 
what we could call sceptical avenues. Nevertheless, the first time, as far 
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as I know, that a thorough study, carried on from a strictly 
philosophical standpoint and mainly focusing on Scepticism, was made 
of the specific Shakespearean treatment of sceptical problems in one of 
his plays appeared in the nineteen sixties when one of the foremost 
American philosophers, Stanley Cavell, published his acclaimed essay 
on King Lear, “The avoidance of love: a reading of King Lear”, soon 
followed by other essays by him, most of them collected in his 1987 
book Disow ning Know ledge: In Six Plays of Shakespeare377. 
The same year, another distinguished scholar, this time not a 
well known philosopher, Graham Bradshaw, published a book, 
Shakespeare’s Scepticism , quite different from Cavell’s but also greatly 
impressive and, I think, innovative. Other articles and essays by other 
authors have followed these pioneer works, similarly exploring 
Shakespeare’s links to Scepticism378. As I said at the beginning of this 
paper, it is my aim to show the essayist philosopher in Shakespeare. I 
intend to fulfil that purpose by focusing on a Shakespearean play from 
a point of view centred on philosophical Scepticism. 
The play I have chosen to consider is that most commented and 
controversial “problem play”, Measure for Measure, which has already 
been at least twice the proper object of a specific reading privileging its 
connection with Scepticism. I am referring to the 5th chapter of 
Bradshaw’s mentioned book, “On Tempering Mercy with J ustice”, 
where its author within an ethical and political framework develops a 
conception of Measure for Measure as a play exploring “the 
incompatibility of different absolute values” (Bradshaw 178), and to a 
very recent article by Lars Engle, “Measure for Measure and 
modernity: the problem of the sceptic’s authority”. 
I belong to those readers of this play whose general impression 
of it clashes with the mainstream of interpreters and commentators, in 
that we do not consider it as the bleakest Shakespearean comedy 
(putting forward an extremely pessimistic view of human nature, so 
pessimistic and desperate a vision that it would fit better in a 
straightforward tragedy, and presenting an irredeemable conception of 
                                                 
377
 Which, also including now a new essay by the Author on a Shakespearean play, has 
been published again this year in second edition and with a slightly different title, 
Disow ning Know ledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare. 
378
 The last in date of these essays, at least in book size, is the study by Millicent Bell, 
Shakespeare’s Tragic Skepticism , published in 2002, which only after completing this 
paper I took notice of. 
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justice). That does not mean either that its depths and its grim vision of 
human nature as well as the W eltanschauung  underlying it should be 
ignored or taken for what they never can be taken: light-hearted and 
quite optimistic. Nevertheless, I would subscribe Raleigh’s judgement 
(Raleigh 166-167): “This world of Vienna, as Shakespeare paints it, is 
not a black world; it is a weak world, full of little vanities and 
stupidities, regardful of custom, fond of pleasure, idle and abundantly 
human”. The Vienna of Measure for Measure after all does not seem to 
me the embodiment of “a corrupt cosmos” as Harold Bloom, for 
instance, considers it (Bloom 358), or a city so corrupted by evil that 
even the walls are gnawed by some leper, as Giuseppe Tomasi di 
Lampedusa eloquently describes it (Lampedusa 82): it is a normal 
commercial city, bustling with life of all sorts and at every level, having 
its grandeurs and its miseries, including some dissoluteness. The 
Duke’s government brings about license just because he is not despotic 
and not really an “authoritarian”, rather a sage more concerned with 
meditation and self-knowledge than with ruling his subjects with tight 
reins. This moderately “positive” view of the life and characters 
portrayed in Measure for Measure is to be considered as perfectly 
capable of coexisting with the highlighting of Scepticism in it, specially 
if we have in mind a certain historical kind of philosophical Scepticism, 
Renaissance Pyrrhonism. That task is after all made easier when we 
think of the full compatibility of this revival of Pyrrhonism not only 
with living but even with the cultivation of an extraordinary enjoyment 
of life as precisely shown by Montaigne and developed throughout the 
Essais379. 
Without aiming at presenting here a new reading of this 
complex play, I shall try only to consider the presence in it of some 
elements of Scepticism which may throw some light on certain aspects 
of the play. 
One of the most perplexing features of Measure for Measure, its 
disappointing and puzzling ending, may indeed become less 
disconcerting and baffling if we try to read it through a sceptical 
perspective. Lars Engle has already tried it but within the scope of an 
interpretation that almost exclusively valorises the problem of 
authority and enforcement of social laws and especially of social reform 
by a sceptical sovereign, seeing thus the ending as “the result of a 
                                                 
379
 Cf. O’Brien 115-116. 
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sceptic’s failed experiment in the invocation of an absolute” (Engle 
110). The sceptic Engle refers to is Vincentio (“a spiritual son to 
Montaigne”, according to René Galland 356) and his mentioned 
experiment is the choice of Angelo as a substitute, a prince apparently 
and decidedly far, by all accounts, from embracing any kind of 
Scepticism. 
Though I accept most of Engle’s ideas, my reading of the play 
somewhat differs from his. The point I shall try to stress is the 
possibility of seeing here (especially in the ending) at play a confluence 
of notions and devices that seem much akin to some we can find in 
Ancient Pyrrhonism, especially in the kind of Pyrrhonism described 
and explained by Sextus Empiricus. There we have a blend of 
epistemological issues and practical concerns, that may also be 
considered a distinctive characteristic of this extraordinary comedy, 
where the most poignant and dramatic dilemma, the existential and 
moral dilemma Angelo puts to Isabella, has also consequences 
concerning belief. Its dramatic impact is enhanced by Isabella, before 
her first encounter with Angelo, being shown as someone prone to 
doubt: 
Lucio.                        Assay the power you have. 
Isabella. My power? alas! I doubt— 
Lucio.                                   Our doubts are traitors, 
And make us lose the good we oft might win, 
By fearing to attempt. (I.iv.76-79) 
Even if Isabella solves the dilemma and decides herself proclaiming the 
supremacy of her chastity over her sisterly love, the preserving of that 
chastity may only be known to her, others not believing her narrative, 
or her version of what she would claim had happened, and believing 
instead Lord Angelo’s word, or just his name and fame: 
Angelo.         Believe me, on mine honour, 
My words express my purpose. 
Isabella.   Ha! Little honour to be much believ’d, 
And most pernicious purpose! Seeming, seeming! 
I will proclaim thee, Angelo; look for my brother, 
Or with an outstrecht’d throat I’ll tell the world aloud 
What man thou art. 
Angelo.         Who will believe thee, Isabel? 
My unsoil’d name, the austereness of my life, 
My vouch against you, and my place i’ the state, 
Will so your accusation overweigh, 
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That you shall stifle in your own report 
And smell of calumny. (II.iv.148-160) 
Angelo.                                         As for you, 
Say what you can, my false o’erweighs your true. 
Isabella.  To whom should I complain? Did I tell this, 
Who would believe me? (II.iv.170-172) 
Of course, readers and spectators are not here preys to doubt about 
Isabella’s chastity. But they may remain in doubt as to the moral 
rightness of her attitude, determined by her “self-centred saintliness” 
(Knight 92). And that doubt is amplified and stressed by Isabella’s 
isolation, by the very circumstance that socially the novice is less 
believable than the Lord Deputy. 
In Act V, when the Duke returns officially to Vienna and Isabella 
publicly presents her case to him, being believed seems for her 
something of an obsession, an issue concerning not only justice but 
even her very mental sanity: 
Isabella.                             O worthy duke! 
You bid me seek redemption of the devil, 
Hear me yourself; for that which I may speak 
Must either punish me, not being believ’d, 
Or wring redress from you. Hear me, O, hear me, here!(V.i.28-32) 
Isabella.  O prince, I conjure thee, as thou believ’st 
There is another comfort than this world, 
That thou neglect me not, with that opinion 
That I am touch’d with madness. (V.i.48-51) 
Isabella.          even so may Angelo, 
In all his dressings, characts, titles, forms, 
Be an arch-villain. Believe it, royal prince: 
If he be less, he’s nothing; but he’s more, 
Had I more name for badness. 
Duke.                         By mine honesty, 
If she be mad, - as I believe no other, - 
Her madness hath the oddest frame of sense, 
Such a dependency of thing on thing, 
As e’er I heard in  madness. 
Isabella.             O gracious duke! 
Harp not on that; nor do banish reason 
For inequality; but let your reason serve 
To make the truth appear where it seems hid, 
And hide the false seems true. (V.i.55-67) 
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Her word being pitted against Angelo’s word, the effort Isabella makes 
to be believed involves Angelo’s virtuous mask falling off and the 
proclamation of what she claims is the truth. Her conception of truth 
is, indeed, stated emphatically as an idealised absolute truth, which is 
most near to the idea of uniform truth that is implicit to most trends of 
sceptical thought: 
Isabella. It is not truer he is Angelo 
Than this is all as true as it is strange; 
Nay, it is ten times true; for truth is truth 
To the end of reckoning. (V.i.42-45) 
A supreme irony is, then, that Isabella, complying to the plan devised 
by Duke Vincentio, when disguised as Friar Lodowick, will publicly 
defend her truth by proclaiming a lie, that she preferred her brother’s 
life to the keeping of her virginity: 
Isabella.              and, after much debatement, 
My sisterly remorse confutes mine honour, 
And I did yield to him. (V.i.100-102) 
Duke.                            This is most likely! 
Isabella. O, that it were as like as it is true! (V.i.104-105) 
A moral dilemma like Isabella’s choice is, independently of any 
connection with philosophical scepticism, an excellent dramatic device. 
Similarly, there is no need to consider the opposition between seeming 
and being against the background of the History of Pyrrhonism to 
explain its function in a play where it is explored. Still, the highlighting 
of such parallels must not be shunned. After all, sceptical philosophy 
has some clear and manifest affinities with playwriting. And there are 
cases, such as, I believe, is the one of Measure for Measure, where the 
accumulation of elements of that sort can seem extremely meaningful. 
One of those elements may be considered relativism of some sort. 
From the viewpoint of the practical side, an important facet of 
the Pyrrhonist’s philosophy resides in the conformity to the observed 
customs of the place wherein one is, thus accepting them just as mere 
customs, changeable and interchangeable, not as unquestionable and 
absolute truths: 
Thus, attending to what is apparent, we live in accordance with 
everyday observances, without holding opinions –  for we are not able to 
be utterly inactive. These everyday observances seem to be fourfold, and 
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to consist in guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing 
down of laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of expertise. […] By 
the handing down of customs and laws, we accept, from an everyday 
point of view, that piety is good and impiety bad. (Sextus 9) 
This position of a relativist sort, if it seems to elude enthusiastic 
adhesions to beliefs, nevertheless may impart temperance, and 
promote tolerance and clemency, as well as can be seen as contributing 
to the improvement and advance of judgement and so to self-
knowledge and to the firmness of conscience. The acceptance of others 
with their faults, rooted on self-knowledge, as a notion that a ruler has 
to bear in mind in governing a society and in administering justice, is 
one of the main lessons imparted by Measure for Measure380 . 
For Vincentio, at the end, pardoning is the way, more than 
performing justice, to substitute it tolerantly, to replace it by clemency 
and by poetic irony, and above all, by a gift to his subjects, the stimulus 
for each one of the judged to continue living a different kind of life, 
more profound and more intense, more meaningful and more 
internally rich. Social, political and moral reform in this world, if not 
complemented by an individual reform, reveals itself as unfeasible as 
the complete enforcement of too severe, too rigid laws, so much so that 
they seem inhuman and cannot but be bent, when not entirely 
forgotten and despised. On the other hand, individual reform seems 
feasible, even if quite difficult for the many obstacles that obstruct its 
way. And the way of individual reform consists precisely in self-
perfecting and in cultivating the art of judgement. 
The need of an internal reform in the individual is just one of 
the predominant themes in the Hellenistic schools of Philosophy, 
aiming at happiness, virtue, tranquillity of mind, and wisdom. What is 
here at stake is basically the wish and the will to accomplish an internal 
metamorphosis leading to those aims. The Pyrrhonist’s response to this 
desideratum seems undoubtedly the most original of all given by those 
schools, as can be seen in the passage of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism  (I, 
12, 25-26), where Sextus, presenting the aim of scepticism, explains 
how Sceptics first attained tranquillity of mind through the practice of 
suspension of judgement: 
                                                 
380
 Not very far from this opinion of ours Wilson Knight declares that “the moral of 
Measure for Measure” was that “nobility in man is inextricably twined with ‘baseness’” 
(Knight 83). 
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we say the aim of the Sceptic is tranquillity in matters of opinion and 
moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us. For Sceptics began to 
do philosophy in  order to decide among appearances and to apprehend 
which are true and which are false, so as to become tranquil; but they 
came upon equipollent dispute, and being unable to decide this they 
suspended judgement. And when they suspended judgement, 
tranquillity in matters of opinion followed fortuitously. (Sextus 10) 
What is here to be emphasised, in this text of paramount importance 
about the aim of ancient scepticism, is not so much the interrelation of 
a practical aim with a clear-cut epistemological attitude (interrelation 
which I have already mentioned as characteristic of Sextian 
Pyrrhonism) as the process through which this interrelation is 
expressed and carried on. Its scheme may be put forward in this simple 
way: desiring to attain an aim and making it their chief philosophical 
task, some philosophers, who later became known as Pyrrhonists, 
developed a strategy they thought the only one possible to achieve that 
aim, and so essentially linked to it, but came to no conclusion, or more 
precisely to what can be described as a sort of philosophical deadline, 
an aporetic situation; they thus discovered epoche, or suspension of 
judgement and renounced their previous strategy, and their former 
aim, but precisely this renouncement led them to what they in the first 
place had renounced, though this time the aim appeared dissociated 
from that strategy. In my interpretation, this attainment of the aim 
(spiritual tranquillity or ataraxia) involves an internal change without 
which it simply would be impossible. 
The main point I want now to stress is that a variant of this 
scheme can precisely be read in Measure for Measure. 
As I see it, renunciation is one of the fundamental themes of the 
play: the Duke’s renunciation (though provisory) of power, first, and 
then of spiritual life as a somewhat monastic recluse; Isabella’s 
renouncement, first, of worldly life, then, of her brother’s life after 
being confronted with the dilemma of choosing between it and her 
chastity, and finally, at the end of the play, to her previous 
renouncements, when it is suggested she is going to accept Vincentio’s 
proposal; Barnardine’s renunciation of life (this more talked about 
than talkative character sounds, in spite of himself, almost a perfect 
sceptic as to the practice of a sort of cultivated and unnatural 
indifference –  adiaphoria); Claudio’s renunciation of family honour; 
Angelo’s renunciation of Mariana (in the action before the play starts), 
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then of his sexual prudery and austerity of life, when he “harasses” 
Isabella, and eventually of what seems dearest to him, the strict 
application of his governing and lawful principles, and his political 
philosophy. 
Nevertheless, the conjunction of all these renunciations could 
be meaningless as to the parallel with the renunciation’s role in 
Pyrrhonism we are trying to establish if most of them were not 
connected to a sort of metamorphosis prompted by a perverse or 
paradoxical effect device (and, of course, if we could not determine 
otherwise the presence of any traces of Scepticism in the play). Indeed, 
it is Barnardine’s indifferent attitude to death and its approaching that 
prompts Vincentio’s change of mind as to his execution. And this 
confirms our intuition that, in more than a way, Barnardine 
unconsciously behaves like a Pyrrhonian for even when he is pardoned 
he has a most wonderful Pyrrhonic reaction: he remains silent, that is 
to say, he keeps aphasia, which means literally non-speaking, and 
which whether it is conceived in a more restricted way or in a more 
general one, is always an important element of Pyrrhonian philosophy. 
It is Claudio’s renunciation that makes him conform to death, or in 
Shakespeare’s expression, said by the Duke: “Be absolute for death; 
either death or life shall thereby be the sweeter” (III.i.5-6). Angelo’s 
renunciations give density to his character and at the end make him 
seem a dignified repentant that fully deserves his pardon. As to the 
renunciations of Isabella and Vincentio, they are interrelated and 
mingled with what Engle calls the “odd denouement” of the play (Engle 
101). In an external dimension, Isabella’s social ascension and her 
change of status must also be noted. Vincentio discloses itself as 
someone who, after his retirement and the failure of Angelo’s severe 
government, reconciles himself with power (now that his has been 
restored) and with worldly life, remaining soft in dispensing law and 
enforcing it. 
Of course, there are characters incapable of such self-
improvement, if I may say so. I am thinking of Lucio, the garrulous 
bawd. The least we can say is that he is the one most rigorously and 
ironically punished character in the play. His deserved punishment is 
so exemplary that it may well provide the best illustration of the title of 
the play, for he, becoming married to a “punk”, becomes permanently 
bound to dissoluteness and bawdiness, and losing social status is 
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reduced to social silence, his two main faults being thus given an 
emblematic correction. 
If we, thus, take in consideration those renunciations and their 
effects as well as the self-improvement they are connected with, we can 
look at the ending as not really disconcerting. What must be pointed 
out is that the Duke, when he returns to power and active life, after his 
small period of contemplative solitude, experiences not so much the 
necessity of merely enforcing justice as the necessity of making justice 
consonant to each citizen’s conscience, as if it came out from within 
them. According to a sceptical art of judgement, justice is then 
dispensed. 
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